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By and large the Western European nations joined the North Atlantic 
Alliance with-only the Communist parties opposing membership. Norway 
was different. Initially the majority of the governing Labor parliamentary 
party was opposed to Norway joining the alliance, and influential members 
of the Conservative Party, including the party chainnan, were skeptical if not 
outspokenly opposed.! 
The Norwegian debate over membership had ramifications reaching 
beyond the boundaries of Norway. As it turned out, both Denmark and 
Iceland followed the Norwegian lead during 1948-49. The Norwegian Labor 
government for a period of time also entertained hopes of pulling Sweden 
into NATO as well. A fair number of senior Swedish military and foreign 
ministry officials clearly would have preferred to have Sweden join the 
Atlantic alliance along with Norway? . 
Neither the United States nor the Scandinavians at any time considered 
Finland a possible pact member. The Finnish government in 1948 had signed 
a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, providing for consultations 
in case of a threat evolving from Gennany or states aligned with Gennany. 
Thus, with the founding of NATO, the Nordic countries were split three 
ways. Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined the Atlantic alliance, Sweden 
remained neutral, though clearly western oriented,and Finland entered into 
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an agreement with the Soviet Union, though without accepting a satellite 
status and while largely maintaining a Western-style domestic political 
system. 
There is no doubt that the Norwegian decision to join pulled Denmark 
and probably also Iceland along. Furthennore, all the Scandinavians more 
or less explicitly demanded and gilined recognition for special treatment 
within the alliance. In February 1949 the Norwegian government by a 
unilateral declaration notified its allies as well as the Rus~ians in February 
1949 that Allied troops would only be stationed in Norway under wartime 
conditions or under the threat of war, The Danes did not explicitly set the 
same conditions for cooperating in the western defense agreement, but for 
all practical purposes followed the Norwegian lead. Iceland, of course, did 
. accept a large American air base, but did not set up its own armed forces. 
As far as the Danes were concerned, . they preferred accepting bases on 
Greenland to handing parts of the island over to the United States, as the 
Americans had proposed as early as 1946.3 
The decision to join NATO is one of the most thoroughly explored issues 
of postwar Norwegian historiography. The domestic Norwegian processes 
leading to membership have been analyzed in two monographs published in 
the early 1970s, Knut Einar Eriksen, DNA og NATO, dealing with the 
decision-making process within the governing Labor party, and Magne 
Skodvin, Norden eller NATO?, detailing the role of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Minister Halvanl Lange in particular.4 Geir Lundestad 
in the monograph; America, Scandinavia and the Cold War 1945-1949, has 
analyzed US-Scandinavian relations from 1945 to the formation of NATO. 
with particular emphasis on Norway'. Rolf Tamnes in The United States 
and the Cold War in the High North deals primarily with the membership 
, K.E. Eriksen, "Great Britain and the Problem of Bases in the Nordic Area, 
1945-1947", ScandinLlVian Journal of History, 7, 1982, pp. 135-163; N. 
Amsttup, "GlJIIDland i det amerikansk-{\anske forhold 1945-48 (Greenland in 
American-Danish Relations 1945-48) in N. AmsUUp and I. Faurby, eds .. Studier 
i flans" udenrigspoUtiIc tilegnet Erling BJpl (Studies in'nanish Foreign Policy in 
Bonor of EIting Bjlfl, Amus, 1978), pp. 155-98; G. Lundestad, America. 
SCandinLlVia and the Cold War 1945-1949 (Oslo. 1980) pp. 36-84. 
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period, but also analyzes the process leading to membership from both the 
US and the Norwegian angle.6 
British policy has been studied in detail in Boward Turner's doctoral 
dissertation, and also in Knut E. Eriksen and Magne Slrodvin, "Storbritannia, 
NATO og et skandinavisk forbund".7 Beige Pharo in "Scandinavia and the 
Early Cold War", has surveyed the period from 1945 to 1951 in a 
comparative Scandinavian perspective, but with Norwegian policies 
providing the main focus.8 
Two historiographical essays survey the field of postwar Norwegian 
security and foreign policy studies, Beige Pharo "The Cold War in 
Norwegian and International Historical Research" from 1985, and Knut E. 
Eriksen and Beige Pharo, "Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk som etterlaigshistorisk 
forskningsfelt" from 1992.' It should be mentioned that for the period up 
to about 1950 Norwegian archives were made available to researchers on a 
privileged basis from the late 1960s. 
For a nation such as Norway, inclined towards non-alignment and with 
an independent existence of less than 50 years, the decision in favor of 
joining NATO was not a self-evident one. In fact during 1948-49 several 
alternative options were considered but in the end found either wanting or 
unrealistic. Our main concern is to explain why Norway chose NATO, albeit 
with important reservations. It is well known that the United States and 
Great Britain wanted Norway as a member of the Atlantic alliance. We shall 
then also deal with the question of possible Anglo-American pressures on 
Norway to join the West, while simultaneously briefly outlining the 
alternative options and why these roads were not taken. 
6 OsIo, 1991. 
7 "Britain, the United States, and Scandinavian Security Problems 1945-
1949", unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Aberdeen, 1982; 
Internosjonal politikk (Norwegian), 3, 1981. 
• In D. Reynolds, eel., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe (Yale UP, 
forthcoming 1994). 
'Scimdinavian Journal of History, 3, 1985; Postwar Norwegian Security 
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The six political parties represented in the Starting were inclined towards 
widely different solutions to Norway's emerging security problem. At the 
one extreme the leadership of the Communist Party, which at the 
parliamentary elections in 1945 had gained some 11 per cent of the vote, 
advocated an alliance, or as a minimum a non-aggression treaty, with the 
Soviet Union. Even within the party, support for such a choice was less than 
whole-hearted. Among the voters this option only served to weaken .the 
Communists. From 1948 onwards support of Soviet policies in Eastern 
Europe, combined with serious internal struggles, led to the decimation of 
the party and its disappearance as a significant political force in postwar 
Norway.'· 
Non-alignment combined with UN membership had significantly higher 
support as a viable alternative for Norway. Such a solution harked back to 
the interwar period when Norway in the 1930s both maintained its 
membership in the League of Nations and towards the end of the decade 
returned to a policy of neutrality. This policy option was supponed by a 
significant faction within the Communist Party, which took over power in 
the party after it split in 1949. The main core of supporters, however, hailed 
from the Labor Party. Most of them belonged to the neutralist and/or pacifist 
groups that had constituted a majority of the prewar Labor parliamentary 
party. In the early postwar years this group was particularly strong among 
the rank and file of the Labor members of the Starting. As a realistic 
alternative the UN option did not last beyond the late spring of 1948.1' 
The reason was that in May 1948 Sweden launched the proposal for a 
non-aligned Scandinavian Defense League with the aim of preventing a split 
among the three nations. The Swedes had taken note of Norwegian 
approaches to Great Britain and the United States, and feared that the Labor 
Government of Einar Gerhardsen would eventually join a Western alliance. 
,. For a thorough analysis of the internal struggles of the Communist Patty, 
based on Norwegian source materials, see T. Halvorsen, NKP i krise. Om 
oppgj~ret med det annet sentrum (NKP in Crisis. On the st@ggles with the 
second center, Oslo, 1981); for a supplementary analysis based on recently 
available materials in Moscow, T. Halvorsen, "StaliIiist l'urges in the Communist 
Patty of Norway 1948-1949, Scandinavian Journal of History, 2, vo118, 1993. 
11 K.E. Eriksen, DNA og NATO, pp. 19-97; K. Blidberg, Just Good Friends. 
Nordic Social Democracy and Security PoUcy 1945-1950 (IFS, Oslo 1987). 
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The Swedish historian Kart Mo1in in a recent book has argued that the 
proposal for a Scandinavian Defense League was mainly intended to deflect 
domestic Swedish pressures for an approach to the West. Our view of the 
issue is that while the Swedish proposal iniriaJJy was panly intended as a 
preventive measure, the Erlander cabinet in the comse of the subsequent 
negotiations came to the conclusion that both in terms of domestic and 
Scandinavian considerations the Defense League represented a sensible and 
viable option. As a consequence Sweden was willing to shoulder 
considerable defense obligations vis-a-vis two virtually defenseless 
neighbors, take on substantial extra financial burdens, and in reality modify 
considerably its long held tradition of isolated neuttality.12 
The postwar Norwegian foreign policy, termed "bridgebuilding", 
presumed a change of policy for Norway if international tensions were to 
rise significantly between former World War n allies. As a consequence of 
the Bevin Plan and the later Czech and Finnish crises during the winter of 
1948, the Labor government started reconsidering its postwar foreign policy 
of bridgebuilding and looking for altematives. As Soviet pressure on Finland 
unfolded, rumors were rife that Norway would receive a similar pact 
proposal from the Russians. During late February and early March of 1948 
Defense Minister Jens Christian Hauge and Foreign Minister Halvanl M. 
Lange contacted the British and US embassies in Oslo to inquire whether the 
Western powers were willing and able to offer military support to Norway 
in case of a wider war or an isolated attack. 13 
Of the options theoretically available, joining the emerging Brussels 
Treaty powers was the least attractive one. In the first place the Norwegian 
government was not certain it would be allowed in. In his speech to the 
Commons in late January Foreign Secretary Bevin had carefully omitted the 
12 K.E. Eriksen, DNA og NATO; Skodvin, Norde" eller NATO; Blidberg, 
Just Good Friends; K. Molin, Omstridd neutraliter. K. Wahlblick, "Sverige og 
det skandinaviska f(jrsvarsRlrbundet: Sju Rlrldaringsfaktorer" (Sweden and the 
Scandinavian Defense League: Seven factors of explanation) in C. Due.Nlelsen 
et al., eds. Danmark. Norde" og NATO 1948-1962, pp. 45-55. 
13 M. Skodvin, Norde" eUer NATO; O. Riste, "Nordic Union or western 
Alliance? Scandinavia at the Crossroads 1948-1949", in E. Di Nolfo. TM 
Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later (Berlin and New York, 1991). pp. 129-142; see 
alSo O. Riste, "Was 1949 a Tuming~Point? Norway and the Western Powers 
1947-1950", in O.Riste, eel •• Wester" Security. TM Formative Years (Oslo. 
1985) pp. 128-149. 
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Scandinavian countries from the circle of possible partners in the process of 
Western European consolidation. Secondly, the Labor cabinet would be loath 
to take on any mutual responsibility to engage in the defense of continental 
states. Partly this was a matter of not being willing to take on military 
responsibility beyond Norwegian territory; partly, of course, the Labor 
cabinet for more general political reasons did not want to . become too 
closely entwined with the more conservative and colonial· states on the 
continent. 
An Anglo-Scandinavian military alliance, further secured by a US military 
guarantee, was the preferred alternative. It would provide the best of all 
worlds; close cooperation between social democrats in Britain and the 
Scandinavian countries as well as North Atlantic cooperation, a Norwegian 
goal since the Second World War. There Were, however, two snags. In the 
first place Swedish participation in such a defense league was utterly 
unlikely. Secondly, Bevin already in March secretly informed Lange that the 
British goal was a broadly based Atlantic alliance to nail down the 
Americans to the defense of Western Europe. What he did not tell Lange, 
was that Britain was not militarily capable of offering Norway a security 
guarantee. I' 
In retrospect we know that by the summer of 1948 only two possible 
options remained, the North Atlantic and the Scandinavian. The Gerhardsen 
government ideally would have liked to combine the two without taking on 
the formal obligations that would be attendant upon membership in the 
North Atlantic Alliance. What the Norwegians initially required as a 
minimum would be weapons and munitions on concessionary conditions as 
well as peacetime military staff talks to prepare for wartime cooperation. 
This would represent an informal but in reality an explicit Western guarantee 
of Norwegian independence and territorial integrity. In shorthand these 
desires could be put in the fonnula "rights without obligations".1S 
The Swedes, of course, did not raise any objections against weapons on 
concessionary conditions, but they were wholly unwilling to accept staff 
talks and peacetime preparation for wartime cooperation. Such obligations 
would formally have spelt the end of their neutrality policies. The Danish 
.. K.E. Eriksen and M. Skodvin, "Storbritannia, NATO og et skandinavisk 
forbund" (Great Britain, NATO and a Scandinavian Defense League) 
Intel7ll1Sjonal poUtilck (Norwegian) 3, 1981, pp. 437-51 L 
15 M. Skodvin, Norden eller NATO; K.E. Eriksen and M. Skodvin, 
"Storbritannia, NATO og et skandinavisk forbund". 
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Social Democratic government at the outset of the Scandinavian ta1ks took 
a position close to the Swedish one, but in effect was willing to go along 
with any compromise solution that the other two were able to agree on. 
Pro-Scandinavian sentiments were running strong in Denmark, particularly 
among the Social Democrats. This groundswell predisposed Denmarlc to opt 
for any Scandinavian pact. Secondly, of course, Danish security depended 
upon the strength and actions of the Western powers on the continent 
regardless of what the Danes themselves were able to accomplish. A 
Scandinavian defense league would add Swedish forces to the defense of 
"Sja:lland" and the Baltic approaches; thus a Scandinavian league clearly 
would repnisent a net addition to Danish security. 16 
Dming the summer of 1948 the three Scandinavian states agreed to set 
up a defense commission to explore the pros and cons of a non-aligned 
defense league. The ultimate decision on whether to go through with the 
scheme would of course be left to the respective governments. The 
commission had completed most of its work by the end of 1948, though its 
complete report was only available some weeks later. There was agreement 
that a Scandinavian defense league would improve the security position of 
the Scandinavian peninsula against a possible attack by the Soviet Union. 
However, the Norwegian and Danish experts in particular emphasized that 
western support would be necessary for effective wartime defense, and that 
such support would have to be prepared in peacetime. This conclusion was 
not least based upon the bitter experience of the bungled 1940 allied 
campaign in Norway." 
Even though the three parties at subsequent cabinet level discussions to 
some degree managed to close the gap between the Swedish and Norwegian 
positions, the negotiators in the end failed to reach an agreement. Two main 
obstacles remained. In the first place it proved impossible to find common 
ground as to the degree of western alignment. The Swedish refusal to accept 
16 N. Petersen, "Optionsproblematikken i dansk sikkedJedspolitikk" ,Danish 
Security Policy and the Question of Options) in N. Amsttup and I. Faurby ells., 
Studier i dansk udenriggpolitilc tUegnet ErUng B}"" pp. 199-23S; N. Petersen, 
"Atlantpag1en eller Nomen?" (The Atlantic Pact or a Scandinavian Defense 
League?) in C. Due-Nielsen et aI., ells., Dat/11III1'k. Norden og NATO 1948-1962, 
pp. 17-42; ibid., K.E. Eriksen and H.(IJ. Pharo, "De fire sirldene i norsk 
utenrikspolitikk", pp. 193-220. 
17 M Skodvln, Norden eller NATO; M. Skodvin, Nordic or North Atlantic 
Alliance. 
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any fonnal ties proved to be unacceptable to Norway. Secondly, the United 
States in January 1949 again made it clear that a non-aligned Scandinavian 
Defense League would not receive preferential treatment with regard to 
weapons deliveries. The requirements of the North Atlantic Pact members 
would be taken care of first)B 
m 
Along with the Norwegian cabinet the British Foreign Office by the fall of 
1948 realized that attempts to pull Sweden into fonnal NATO membership 
would prove futile. As an alternative the head of the Northern Department 
of the Foreign Office, Sir Robin Hankey, approached the Norwegians with 
a very tentative proposal for solving the Scandinavian security problem, later 
known as the Hankey Plan. The British discussed the plan in some detail 
with the Norwegians, .in October 1948 and then returned to the matter 
among themselves in January 1949. Only in the first instance was the plan 
the subject of serious discussion. The Americans were infonned of the 
British proposal, but neither participated in the discussions nor reached any 
conclusions as regards its substance. 
The essence orthe plan was the concept of interlocking pacts. Norway 
and Denmark were to participate both in the North Atlantic Pact and a 
Scandinavian Defence League, while Sweden was to be a member only of 
the latter. In case of war the two Western Scandinavians would sho.ulder the 
.same obligations as the other NATO nations, while Sweden would take on 
more limited commitments. Sweden would contribute to closing the Baltic 
approaches, supply intelligence infonnation to NATO, and commit Swedish 
foreign trade and .the economy more generally to the Western cause. 
Fonnally the NATO guarantee was only to apply to Danish and Norwegian 
territory; in reality, of course, this kind of cooperation could only function 
if Sweden was also placed under the Western umbrella. I ' 
18 M. Skodvin, Norden eller NATO; M. Skodvin, Nordic or North Atlantic 
Alliance; K.E. Eriksen and M. Skodvin, "Storbritannia, NATO og et nordisk 
forbund". 
19 K.E.Eriksen and M. Skodvin, "Storbritannia, NATO og et skandinavisk 
forbund"; H. Turner, "Britain, the United States and Scandinavian Security 
Problems 1945-1949". 
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As far as the British Foreign Office was concerned, Norway and Denmark 
primarily represented security liabilities. They still suffered from wartime 
desttuction and their military preparedness left much to be desired. Norway's 
importance lay above all in its important strategic position, in the 
traditionally close ties to Britain, and to a degree in its large merchant 
marine. Norwegian ships, however, were mainly to be found in waters 
controlled by the Western powers, and as in 1940 could easily be taken over 
by the West. Sweden, on the other hand, was both militarily and 
economically a force to be reckoned with in Europe. In view of French 
colonial commitments, within Europe Sweden after Britain was probably the 
strongest military power outside the iron cuttain. 
For such a plan to be presented to the Swedes it would first of all have 
to be accepted by Norway. In Norway it was never widely discussed. It was 
never discussed in cabinet meetings, nor in the Foreign Relations committee 
of the Stoning, where both NATO membership and the Scandinavian 
Defence League were discussed. Only the Prime,Foreign and Defense 
Ministers were privy to the plan, and they rejected it out of hand. 
It was least important that to give Sweden pn:feJential treatment in this 
way was unacceptable for domestic political reasons. Opposition to North 
Atlantic alignment was running strong in the Labor party, particularly so 
among the members of the Starting. They would regard the proposal for 
interlocking pacts as an argument for Norway seeking the same solution as 
Sweden was being offered. To the cabinet inner circle, however, it was more 
important that such a proposal primarily would represent a waste of time and 
effort. The three of them wen: for good reasons convinced that the Swedes 
would never accept such modifications of their neutrality policy. In effect, 
the Hankey plan would only complicate the ongoing Scandinavian 
discussions. Subsequent historical research, including our own cmn:nt work 
not yet published, find overwhelming support for that conclusion. So far no 
evidence has been found to suggest there would have been any Swedish 
support for the Hankey plan.20 
20 C. Due-Nielsen et al., eels., Danmark, Norden og NATO 1948-62 , 
discussion after K. Wahlbllck's paper, pp.56-57; M. Skodvin, Nordic or North 
Atlantic Alliance?; K.E. Eriksen and M. Skodvin, "Stolbritannia, NATO og et 
skandinavisk forbund"; 489-92, 496-97; the conclusion reganllng the extent of 
the discussion on the Norwegian side is based on our reading of the velbatim 
minutes of the Stoning Foreign Affairs committee and the papers of the Prime 
Minister's office; access to both have been given on a privileged basis for our 
11 
By the end of Januarj 1949 it was clear to most participants that the 
Scandinavian discussions had failed, even though when Foreign Minister 
Lange in February travelled to Washington D.C. to investigate the modalities 
for Norwegian participation in the North Atlantic Pact, he was also to 
present the arguments in favor of a Scandinavian Defence League. However, 
this final effort must be seen mainly as a measure designed for domestic 
Norwegian consumption. The Labor party leadership needed to persuade its 
own rank and file in particular, that every conceivable effort had been made. 
At the same time preparations were being intensified to gain the fullest 
possible support for membership in the Atlantic alliance at the upcoming 
biannual Labor convention. The last failed effort during this process was the 
Danish proposal in early February for a Swedish-Danish alliance. The 
Swedes promptly turned it down. From their point of View Denmark 
represented no more than a military liability. 21 ' 
Even though Great Britain and France in particular were willing to accept 
and possibly preferred a ScandinaVian Defense League linked to the West, 
official policy in the United States and Canada remained opposed or at least 
strongly skeptical of such a solution in Northwestern Europe. The French, 
of course, preferred a pact with a continental and Mediterranean focus, and 
feared that the strength of the West would be diluted by the alliance' taking 
on obligations in the north as well. Furthermore the French preferred fewer 
competitors for the liIriited supply of weapons and munitions. As for the 
Russians any ,Scandinavian Defence League'would be seen'as linked to the 
West, regardless of whether this was formally the case. This Russian 
position made it considerably more difficult for the opposition in NOrway 
and Denmark to argue for an independent ScandinaVian option. ' 
work on the history of Norway's foreign relations 1950-65. 
21 K.E. Eriksen and M. Skodvin, .... Storbritannia, NATO og et skandinavisk 
forbund"; K.E. Eriksen and H.0. Pharo, "ne fire sirldene i norsk utenrikspolitikk 
1949-1961". " 
12 
Most historians who have dealt with the issues of the Scandinavian Defense 
League and the Atlantic Pact largely agree that domestic preferences, 
historical experience and geostrategic positions far outweigh international 
pressures in explaining the different choices made by the three nations.22 
First of all their wartime· experiences differed fundamentally. Sweden 
remained successfully neutral, and in the postwar years the concept of 
neutrality enjoyed overwhelming popular support and served as the guiding 
star for Swedish policy-makers. Denmark and Norway on the other hand 
were quickly conquered by Gennany and remained occupied for the duration 
of the war. Thus neutrality in these two countries was seen to embody the 
complete failure of the foreign and defense policies of the interwar period. 
In the case of Norway the London government-in-exile became an active 
partner in the grand.a1liance, and cooperated both closely and in many ways 
successfully with the two western great powers. Thus important leaders of 
the postwar Labor party had enjoyed a learning experience that eroded 
traditional Norwegian skepticism of both alliances and great powers. As 
opposed to Labor in Sweden the foreign policy elite of the Norwegian Labor 
Party tended to emphasize both great power leadership and responsibility in 
international affairs, and a considerable community of interests between 
small powers and large.23 
Their geostrategic positions also tended to pull the three states in different 
directions. Norway was above all a North Atlantic state in tenns of security 
interests, and in the case of conflict between the two emerging blocs, 
Norwegian territory would be the most vulnerable and the least easily 
defended. Sweden, of course, was also western oriented in tenns of trade 
and economic interests, but its security policies were more geared to cater 
to its Baltic position. When declining to join the Atlantic Alliance. the 
Swedes also had Finland in mind. Swedish membership in NATO was likely 
to provoke the Soviets to take over Finland. That was in itself undesirable, 
22 K. Blidberg. Just Good Friends; G. Lundestad, America. Scandinavia and 
the Cold War 1945-49, pp. 352-358; K.E. Eriksen and H.0. Pharo. ''Norsk 
sikkemetspolitikk som etterlaigshistorisk forskningsfelt", pp. 22-31. 
23 M. Skodvin, Norden eller NATO; O. Riste. "Nordic Union or Westem 
Alliance?"; this conclusion is strengthened by our own current research on the 
history of Norwegian policy, 1950-65. 
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and would at the same time bring the Soviets right up to the Swedish border, 
thus reducing the warning time in case of an attack. The security and 
integrity of Denmark depended upon the balance of power on the continenL 
As long as the Western allies controlled their pan of Gennany the Danes 
were protected; if the west was forced to retreat there was little Denmark 
could do to fend for itself. The Danes considered a Scandinavian Defense 
League as an additional security guarantee; for Norway it represented an 
insufficient one. 
Wide differentials in tenns of military power and economic strength may 
also contribute to explaining the positions taken during the Scandinavian 
defense negotiations. As a proud and relatively strong middle power Sweden 
was wholly unwilling to be subjected to American or British military 
leadership. Compared to the Norwegians the Swedish leadership was far less 
concerned with possible American and British disapproval of their policies. 
The government in Stockholm was certainly far less worried than the Oslo 
one that the Scandinavians might not be able to acquire weapons from the 
west on concessionary conditions. 
The intellectual outlook of leaders as well as the climate of popular 
opinion also differed significandy between Norway, Denmark and Sweden. 
Danish Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft in particular was an outspoken 
supporter of closer Scandinavian cooperation, a "Skandinavist" or ''Nordist''. 
Popular support for Scandinavian or Noidic cooperation was much stronger 
in both Sweden and Denmark than in Norway throughout the interwar period 
as well as during the first postwar decades. Norwegians, political elites as 
well as public opinion, Labor and bourgeois, tended to view such 
cooperation with considerable skepticism. The historical heritage of having 
been a very junior partner in unions with both Denmark and Sweden, the 
continued Swedish dominance in Scandinavia after the dissolution of the last 
union in lOOS, and the pro-Gennan neutrality policies of Sweden in the early 
pan of the war, troubled Norwegians well into the 1950s and 1960s. In the 
early postwar years explicidy anti-Swedish sentiments were on occasion 
strongly pronounced. 24 
2A K.E. Eriksen, DNA og NATO; we deal with this issue quite extensively in 
our forthcoming wOJk. 
14 
Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander in his memoirs in fact mused that 
the ensuing division among the Scandinavian countries may have been the 
best solution: 
Norway with its ever-present chip on the shoulder with regards to Sweden. 
which at times forces the Norwegian government into the strangest of actions. 
and recurring outbursts of independence rhetoric in the Norwegian press - is 
that a proper partner for careful Sweden.25 
v 
In spite of all the factors predisposing Norway to choose the Atlantic 
Alliance the decision was by no means easy. While the historical heritage 
in many ways was divisive, the Scandinavians held many things in common 
as regards language, history and similar political institutions and 
development An analogous point of view may be applied with regard to 
Norway's relationship with the Soviet Union. On the hand membership in 
the Alliance was desirable as a means of protection against the assumed 
threat from the eastern neighbor. On the other hand the Norwegian 
government wonied that membership might turn out to be unduly 
provocative. In the same way we must note that while there was certainly 
widespread sympathy and admiration for the British, and to a lesser extent 
for the Americans, the occupation experience as well as the national 
uncertainties that were strongly pronounced in the new Norwegian state, 
made it desirable to keep the potential western protectors at a certain 
distance. This was also important for domestic political reasons. While the 
Communists declined in strength after the coup in Czechoslovakia, 
skeptisicm of the West remained strong on Labor's left." . 
These contradictory tendencies made for a pronounced ambivalence in 
alliance policies. Once having secured its position in the West by joining the 
Atlantic Pact, Norway set about limiting its· commitments. In significant 
respects Norway achieved an exceptional membership status. On the one 
hand Norwaymanaged tonail Britain and the United States to the defense 
of Western Europe's northern flank; on the other hand the Gerhardsen and 
Torp governments managed to avoid military arrangements that could be 
25 Tage Erlander 1940-1949 (Oslo. 1973). s. 293: 
.. K.E. Eriksen, DNA og NATO. 
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consideIed unduly provocative by the Soviet Union, a policy of screening 
and comminnent as historian Rolf Tamnes has dubbed it. The most 
imponant limitations imposed by the Norwegians are represented by the 
bases declaration and limitations upon allied military activities in North 
NOrway, and a minimal presence of American military advisers in 
Norway.21 
Even before signing the Pact in Washington in April 1949, the Norwegian 
government issued what has become known as the bases declaration. In 
essence it stated that Norway would not accept the presence of foreign 
forces unless engaged in war or was consideIed threatened by war. Initially 
the bases declaration caused no difficulties with the Americans and the 
British. In 1949 they had neither the desire for bases, nor the military 
capability to defend them. If a demand for bases had been presented at this 
time, the Labor government would not have applied for membership. No 
responsible politician in Norway would have accepted bases at the time. 
After the outbreak of the Korean War both the Norwegian military and 
allied powers, represented by the American and British military in particular, 
applied considerable pressure to have the declaration changed, particularly 
with the goal of setting up NATO air bases. The majority of Norwegian 
politicians nevertheless held fast. Neither were they subsequently willing to 
have nuclear weapons stationed on Norwegian territory. By 1960 the Labor 
fOreign policy elite was even considering rejecting NATO's nuclear first 
strike option in case of a massive Soviet conventional attack, thus trying to 
keep Norway out of the first phase of a war in Europe. As Foreign Minister 
27R. T&mnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North; K.E. 
Eriksen and H.0. Pharo, Norslc lItenr/lcspoUtiIcks historie 1950-65 , forthcoming 
. . 
1996, Scandinavian University Press; Einat GedJardsen in the first 20 years of 
the postwar era headed foot cabinets, an immediate postwar coalition cabinet in 
the summer and fall of 1945, a majority Labor cabinet from 1945 to 1951, a 
majority Labor cabinet from 1955 to 1961, which continued as minority 
government with support from the Socialist People's party until the fall of 1963, 
then after a two-week non-Labor interregum was back in power from September 
1963 till October 1965, wheo the non-Labor parties gained a majority in the 
Stoning. From the middle of 1951 till Janwuy 1955 Oscar Torp headed a Labor 
cabinet. The two-week non-Labor cabinet in 1963 was headed by the 
Conservative John Lyng with the Christian People's Party Erling Wikborg as 
Foreign Minister: Trygve Lie served as Foreign Minister until Febrwuy 1946 in 
GedJardsen's two first cabinets, then Halvard Lange served until 1965 with the 
exception of the two weeks in 1963. 
16 
Lange commented to the Swedish ambassador, on this vital issue Norwegian 
and Swedish security policies had in fact converged.2lI 
In a conversation with British Defense Minister Lord Alexander, 
Norwegian Defense Minister Jens Christian Hauge in the spring of 1949 
characterized North Norway as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and 
the Atlantic Alliance. He emphasized that he wanted no allied military .. 
activity in this area. In subsequent years this policy was somewhat modified, 
but in January 1951 the cabinet announced that no NAlO maneuvers nor 
allied ships nor ain:raft were allowed on Norwegian territory or within 
Norwegian territorial waters east of the twenty-forth meridian, making for 
a distance of 350 km to the Soviet border. The number of allied units 
visiting Norway at anyone time was also regulated, as was the need for 
prior clearance for all flights over Norwegian territory." 
Also allied military advisers and technicians were kept at a minimum, and 
replaced by Norwegians wherever and whenever possible. The Northern 
command at KolsAs near Oslo was certainly considered both necessary and 
desirable when it was established in 1951. Still Norwegian govemmnents 
worked hard to keep it under domestic political control and to increase the 
proportion of Norwegian staff officers. During the latter part of the 1950s 
a few leading politicians and military even wanted to transform it into an 
exclusive Dane-Norwegian command. This idea was rejected by the Foreign 
and Defense Ministers,· who argued that such a solution would put most of 
Denmark under the Central command. Thus the Danes, still strongly 
skeptical of the southern neighbor, would be unlikely to accept a change that 
would put the greater part of Demnarlc into a future German-dominated 
zone. 
Finally it should be noted that during the first months of the alliance, 
Defense Minister Hauge, one of the most avid proponents of Norwegian 
NAlO membership, argued against the possible development towards an 
integrated military alliance with a joint command structure. When the 
proposal was launched in the aftennath of the Korean War, however, the 
international enviromnent had changed to such a degree that the Government 
2B K.E. Eriksen and H.0. Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolltikks historie 1950-65, 
forthcoming 1996 . 
. 29 See M. BenIal, "Norway in United States Naval Strategy, 1954-1960: 
. Bilateral Strategic Planning in a Multilateral· Alliance" (Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, StAnthony's College, Oxford, 1992), p.34; see also 1.1. HOIst, 
"Norwegian Security Policy", Cooperation and Conflict, n, 1966, pp. 70-71. 
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found it necessary and even desirable to accept it. Commitment then took 
precendence over scn:ening, even in the face of considerable bourgeois-
nationalist opposition.3O 
VI 
Given this profound reluctance to accept all the implications of NATO 
membership, we may legitimately ask why the Labor government chose to 
join the alliance in the first place. As a consequence of increasing East-West 
tension and the heavy-handed Soviet approach to Finland in February and 
March 1948 the Norwegian government by the spring felt a need for a 
Western guarantee for the nation's security and territorial integrity. The 
deeply held Norwegian fear during this period can only be fully understood 
if we keep in mind the fact that the Gennan attack in April 1940 and the 
end of the occupation period were still fresh in the minds of policy-makers 
and the public in general. To remind them of those recent trials in the life 
of the new state, the report of the Commission to investigate the events of 
1940 was being completed during this same period. No Norwegian 
government would easily contemplate being held responsible for another 
calamity of such proportions. 
Fmthermore, while all three Scandinavian nations until 1940 had pursued 
a policy of neutrality, the Norwegian one also entailed what has been 
dubbed a reserve position. The pursuit of neutrality was based on the 
assumption that none of the major powers had any interest in acquiring 
Norwegian territory. Secondly, and this is the crux of the matter, if any 
hostile nation were to have designs on Norway, the British navy would 
prevent the aggressor from succeeding. Britain would in fact in its own 
interest come to the aid of Norway. This, briefly put, is the theory of the 
implicit or automatic British guarantee, which historian Olav Riste has 
developed in several works. April 1940 demonstrated that the implicit 
guarantee did not function as intended by Norwegian foreign policy-makers. 
30 K.E. Eriksen and H.0. Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitikks hlstorte 1950-65, 
fOI1hcomlng 1996. 
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The lesson was drawn that wartime support would not function adequately 
without peacetime preparation.31 
This lesson was temporarily applied during the war, when the London 
government was a prime mover for a postwar North Atlantic alliance. As the 
United States, however, preferred a universal security organization,·· the 
United Nations, to the fonnationof regional alliances, Norway towards the 
end of the war opted for a policy dubbed bridgebuilding. By keeping a low 
proftle and promoting big power cooperation Norway hoped to maintain its 
security and territorial integrity without fonnal ties to the Western powers. 
Bridgebuilding was in the first place built on the hope that the great powers 
could maintain a minimum of good will between themselves. If international 
relations were to take a decisive turn for the worse, however, Norway would 
in its turn approach the west for a fonnal guarantee, thus reverting to the 
Atlantic policy of the war years. 
Norway in fact in the immediate aftermath of World War IT placed itself 
more firmly under the British defense umbrella than had been the case in the 
interwar period. Above all, several of the ties of wartime military 
cooperation were maintained into the postwar period. The Norwegian 
military trained and were taught in Britain, and all three services were 
largely furnished with British weapons and other equipment As agreed 
during the war, from 1947 onwards the better part of the Norwegian 
conscript army was placed in Germany under British command as part of the 
British occupational forces. This semi-alliance certainly made it less difficult 
for Norway than for Denmark and Sweden to join in a fonnal military 
alliance where Britain in the northern area would be the major partner, 
though we find elements of a semi-alliance also in DenmllIk's relationship 
with Britain. This Norwegian choice for the West - as was realized by the 
British and the Americans at the time - was also the all-important factor for 
Iceland and Denmark. Without Norwegian membership in the alliance 
neither of them would have joined NATO.32 
31 In addition to the works previously cited, see in particular, "Functional ties 
- A semi-Alliance", in o. Riste ed., Defence Studies (Oslo, 1991); and 
"Isolationism and Great Power Protection. The Historical Detenninants of 
Norwegian Foreign Policy", in U. HoIst, ed., Norwegian Foreign PoUcy for the 
1980s (Oxford/Oslo, 1985). 
32 K.E. Eriksen and H.I2I. Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie 1950-1965, 
forthcoming 1996; see alsO o. Riste, "Was 1949 a Turning-Point"; and also in 
O. Riste, Western Security, R Tamnes, ''Norway's Struggle for the Northem 
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There was never any strong pressure through diplomatic or military 
channels from either the United States or Great Britain for Norway to join 
the Atlantic Alliance. Both Foreign Minister Bevin and Secretaries of State 
MlIrshall and Acheson made it clear to the Norwegians that the choice was 
tlieir own to make. Yet they did point out that they disliked a non-aligned 
dCfense league on the Swedish model. The American and British policy~ 
makers were certainly influenced by the perceived need to prevent the Soviet 
Union from gaining control of any part of Norwegian territory. Their 
preference was for a policy of denial, however implemented. The Americans 
indeed made it clear that the Pact members would be given priority with 
regards to the supply of weapons and equipment, while simultaneously 
emphasizing that these were certainly inadequate relative to European 
needs." . 
For the small Norwegian state, faced with a heavy reconstruction burden 
after the ravages of the war, the latter was a significant argument in favor 
ofI.joining the West. Pact membership was furthermore considered a means 
ofinaintaining the store of good will that Norway had banked with the west 
as a result of its wartime policies. These intangibles were by many seen as 
equally important 
Domestic political considerations in fact played a very important role for 
those having to decide on Norway's security alignment The bourgeois 
parties overwhelmingly preferred close economic and political ties with the 
western powers. It is likely that a majority of the Labor parliamentary party 
would have preferred a Scandinavian league under Swedish leadership, and 
Priine Minister Gerharosen for some time shared that view. When ID the end 
he'opted for NATO membership, domestic political considerations of both 
a national and a party nature were decisive. Labor on the one hand might 
split along the middle, and the non-Labor opposition might wreck 
Flank"; and M Skodvin, Norden eller NATO . 
.. M Skodvin, Norden eUer NATO; for a somewhat diverging view, G. 
Lundestad, "USA, skandil'\llvisk forsvarsforbund og Halvard Lange: En 
revurdering" {'lbe United States, a Scandinavlan Defense League and Halvard 
Lange: A Reevaluation} Internasjonol politikk (Norwegian},I, Im, 139-173; for 
a wrspping up of the discussion, ibid. 1977, K.E. Eriksen, "NATO, Norden og 
den utto Ijener Halvard Lange" (NATO, the Nordic countries and the unfaithful 
servant Halvard Lange), ibid.;.2. 1977. pp. 261-302. and final comment in ibid., 
. 4/lm. pp. 747-752;00 the Americlm-British denial strategy, seeM. Berdal, 
"NOIway in United States Strategy". p. 35. 
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completely the national foreign policy consensus. In the end the Labor 
opposition was the least obstacle to national cohesion. He felt that there had 
to be strong national consensus over the foreign policy of a small nation.34 
In sum, domestic needs in a very general sense, the need for the greatest 
possible national political cohesion and the preferences of the western great 
powers would be best served by Norwegian membership in the Atlantic 
alliance. Neither should we discount the importance of Norway's little 
brother or union complex with regard to Sweden. Yet the scales tipped only 
lightly in that direction, thus the subsequent search for screening measures. 
American interests, as defined by the Truman administration, were 
certainly also well served by the Norwegian decision in favor of an 
alignment with the west. Norway's participation in the Pact would strengthen 
both its democratic and Atlantic character. Even if Norway in some ways 
represented a military liability for the United States and Britain, at the same 
the country made significant military contributions. With the establishment 
of a Scandinavian Defense League the peninsula as well as Denmark would 
have become a potentially dangerous grey zone between East and WesL As 
a founding member Norway instead served as a magnet pulling Denmark 
and Iceland into the alliance as well. Thus the alliance gained a member 
bordering the Soviet Union that could provide facilities in peacetime and 
bases in wartime. At the same time Greenland and Iceland provided the very 
desirable "stepping stones" between North America and Europe.15 The 
dynamic of events and needs during 1948-49 pulled as well as pushed 
Norway towards the emerging alliance. 
34 K.E. Erlksen, DNA og NATO. 
lIS For a thorougbt and muminating analysis on the differing US points of 
- view -of Norway and the evolution of the US position, including the issue of 
"stepping stones", see O. Lundestad, America, Scandinavia and the Cold War, 
1945-1949, pp. chapter 8, pp. 235-289. 
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